Soverign risk and the effects of fiscal retrenchment in deep recessions by Giancarlo Corsetti et al.
 
WORKING PAPER NO. 11-43 
SOVEREIGN RISK AND THE EFFECTS OF  






Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 
 
André Meier 
International Monetary Fund 
 
Gernot J. Müller 
University of Bonn 
 
September 23, 2011 Sovereign risk and the eﬀects of
ﬁscal retrenchment in deep recessions
Giancarlo Corsetti, Keith Kuester, Andr´ e Meier, and Gernot J. M¨ uller∗
September 23, 2011
Abstract
We analyze the eﬀects of government spending cuts on economic activity in an en-
vironment of severe ﬁscal strain, as reﬂected by a sizeable risk premium on government
debt. Speciﬁcally, we consider a “sovereign risk channel,” through which sovereign default
risk spills over to the rest of the economy, raising funding costs in the private sector. Our
analysis is based on a variant of the model suggested by C´ urdia and Woodford (2009).
It allows for costly ﬁnancial intermediation and inter-household borrowing and lending
in equilibrium, but maintains the tractability of the baseline New Keynesian model. We
show that, if monetary policy is constrained in oﬀsetting the eﬀect of higher sovereign risk
on private-sector borrowing conditions, the sovereign risk channel exacerbates indetermi-
nacy problems: private-sector beliefs of a weakening economy can become self-fulﬁlling.
Under these conditions, ﬁscal retrenchment can limit the risk of macroeconomic instabil-
ity. In addition, if ﬁscal strain is very severe and monetary policy is constrained for an
extended period, ﬁscal retrenchment may actually stimulate economic activity.
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In the wake of the global ﬁnancial crisis, public debt in many industrialized countries has
risen to such levels that ﬁscal retrenchment cannot be avoided. Standard models and evi-
dence from vector autoregressions suggest that this retrenchment will weigh on short-term
growth.1 In fact, to the extent that monetary policy is constrained by the zero lower bound
on interest rates (ZLB, henceforth), the headwinds from ﬁscal tightening could be even more
severe (Christiano et al. 2011 and Woodford 2011).2 Common wisdom, therefore, holds that
retrenchment should be delayed until the economy has fully recovered (for example, Corsetti,
Kuester, Meier and M¨ uller 2010).
However, the sovereign risk premium has been rising sharply in several countries, causing
policy-makers to start ﬁscal tightening even as private demand remains weak. What are
the likely consequences for economic activity? In the present paper, we assess this question
quantitatively, starting from the observation that strains in sovereign funding tend to spill
over into private credit markets.3 Because of such spillovers, rising sovereign indebtedness
can negatively aﬀect economic activity through its eﬀects on interest rates faced by ﬁrms and
households. Via this channel, ﬁscal retrenchment upfront can help improve credit conditions
in the broader economy, thereby counteracting the otherwise contractionary eﬀects of lower
public spending.
Recent developments in Europe provide evidence in support of such a “sovereign risk channel.”
The panels in Figure 1 display time-series data on credit default swap (CDS) spreads for
sovereign debt and non-ﬁnancial corporate debt.4 The ﬁgure focuses on two sets of euro area
countries: those with relatively low sovereign spreads (left panel) and those with relatively
1Hall (2009) surveys the relevant empirical research that predates the recent global ﬁnancial crisis and ﬁnds
that most studies report government spending multipliers on output in the range of 0.5 to 1.0. The predictions
of standard business cycle models fall in a similar range.
2Time-series evidence also indicates that multiplier eﬀects tend to be larger during recessions (Auerbach
and Gorodnichenko 2010) and during ﬁnancial crises (Corsetti, Meier and M¨ uller 2010).
3This is prominently embedded in the notion of a “sovereign ceiling.” In a strict interpretation, the sovereign
ceiling posits that no debtor in a given country can have a better credit quality than the government, a primary
reason being the latter’s capacity to extract private-sector resources through taxation. In reality, some authors,
including Durbin and Ng (2005), have documented exceptions to this rule, notably for ﬁrms with substantial
export earnings or close links to foreign ﬁrms. Even then, however, sovereign and corporate bond yields comove
signiﬁcantly (see, for instance, the literature review in Cavallo and Valenzuela (2007) or Harjes (2011)). In the
context of the global ﬁnancial crisis both the International Monetary Fund (2010a) and the European Central
Bank (2010) have stressed that government bond yields typically have a strong inﬂuence on domestic corporate
bond yields.
4A similar set of charts was ﬁrst provided in International Monetary Fund (2011).
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Notes: 5-year CDS spreads in high-spread and low-spread euro area countries, as well as for nonﬁnancial
corporations headquartered there. Low-spread euro area includes Austria (number of ﬁrms in our sample: 1),
Finland (1), France (24), Germany (18), and Netherlands (8). High-spread euro area includes Belgium (number
of ﬁrms: 1), Greece (1), Ireland (0), Italy (4), Portugal (2), and Spain (4). The corporations in our sample
are the constituents of the Itraxx Europe index. The same relative weights are adopted for the sovereign and
corporate index series. For example, of the 52 ﬁrms in the low-spread euro area sample, 24 are headquartered
in France. As a result, in the sovereign low-spread euro area series, France has a weight of 24/52. Data sources:
Bloomberg; Markit.
high sovereign spreads (Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain).5 The series
display substantial comovement, particularly in countries that face ﬁscal strain (right panel).
For the time period shown, the daily correlation between corporate and sovereign CDS spreads
in high-spread countries is 0.71. For the low-spread countries, it is lower, but still signiﬁcantly
positive at 0.36 percent.
In this paper, we explore the implications of the sovereign risk channel building on the model
proposed by C´ urdia and Woodford (2009). This allows for household heterogeneity, as private
agents engage in borrowing and lending via ﬁnancial intermediaries. In our variant of the
model private credit spreads rise with sovereign risk because strained public ﬁnances raise
the costs of ﬁnancial intermediation. While this is not the only possible way of envisioning
spillovers through the sovereign risk channel, it allows for a tractable representation within a
simple variant of the canonical New Keynesian model. Consequently, we are in a position to
complement our numerical results with analytical solutions for interesting special cases.
Our formal analysis of the sovereign risk channel gives rise to two distinct sets of results.
Both are related to the fact that higher sovereign risk dampens aggregate demand, unless
5We focus on evidence for the euro area in order to control for monetary policy. Monetary policy is a key
factor in determining the strength of the sovereign risk channel according to our analysis below.
3monetary policy manages to oﬀset the eﬀect that sovereign risk has on private-sector fund-
ing costs. Oﬀsetting sovereign risk would typically involve a cut in the policy rate. Yet the
normal operation of monetary policy may be hampered when nominal rates are near zero.
Our ﬁrst ﬁnding is that under these circumstances sovereign risk may give rise to equilib-
rium indeterminacy. The reason is that private-sector beliefs about a weakening economy
can become self-fulﬁlling. Speciﬁcally, a pessimistic shift in expectations implies an upward
revision of the projected government deﬁcit. This causes a higher risk premium on public
debt and, through the sovereign risk channel, on private debt as well. Higher private funding
costs, in turn, slow down activity, thus validating the initial adverse shift in expectations.
Under normal circumstances, this scenario can arguably be averted by the central bank’s
commitment to appropriately adjust the policy rate. To the extent that monetary policy is
constrained, however, expectations may become self-fulﬁlling, especially when sovereign risk
is already high. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we therefore ﬁnd that in the presence of
severe ﬁscal strain, expectations of a pro-cyclical spending response, that is, ﬁscal tightening,
can help to ensure determinacy.
Our second set of results concerns the sign and the size of the government spending multiplier.
We ﬁnd that for reasonable parameterizations the presence of a sovereign risk channel reduces
the spending multiplier. A ﬁscal retrenchment may therefore have less adverse eﬀects on
economic activity than in the absence of sovereign risk. Quantitatively, however, the role
of the sovereign risk channel is of limited importance even at high levels of public debt—
provided that monetary policy is unconstrained and able to oﬀset changes in the sovereign
risk premium. By contrast, if public debt and hence sovereign risk is high, and monetary
policy is constrained by the ZLB for an extended period, we ﬁnd that ﬁscal retrenchment can
stimulate economic activity, that is, the government spending multiplier turns negative.
Our results thus provide a fresh perspective on the “expansionary eﬀects” of ﬁscal contrac-
tions that have been emphasized in a prominent study of Ireland and Denmark during the
1980s by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990).6 In order to rationalize expansionary consolidations,
theoretical accounts have often focused on the “expectations view,” whereby immediate ﬁscal
consolidation triggers a shift in expectations regarding the long-run level of spending, and
6The evidence on expansionary consolidations remains controversial. For a positive assessment, see, for ex-
ample, Alesina and Perotti (1995) or Alesina and Ardagna (2010). A skeptical view is provided by International
Monetary Fund (2010b). Perotti (2011) provides a reassessment.
4thus a downward revision of the anticipated tax burden (Bertola and Drazen 1993, Sutherland
1997, and Perotti 1999).7 However, Giavazzi and Pagano also stress that monetary policy
may have played an important role. Speciﬁcally, the consolidations in Ireland and Denmark
were accompanied by credible exchange rate pegs, which, arguably, led to declining country
risk premiums and lower real interest rates. More recently, Erceg and Lind´ e (2010a) have
analyzed government spending cuts in a model of a currency union where country risk is a
function of the state of public ﬁnances.8
As a caveat we emphasize that the present paper is not meant to add to the theory of
sovereign default. Following Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), a number of authors, including
Arellano (2008) and Mendoza and Yue (2010), have recently modeled default as a strategic
decision of a sovereign that balances the gains from forgone repayment against the costs of
exclusion from international credit markets. In equilibrium this implies that the probability
of default increases in the level of debt. In order to maintain the tractability of our model for
business cycle analysis, we impose such a relationship without explicitly modeling a strategic
default decision.9 In the same vein, the current paper imposes a sovereign risk channel in
order to explore its role for ﬁscal policy transmission, but it leaves a richer theoretical account
of the underlying mechanism for future research. In particular, a straightforward yet crucial
assumption in our analysis is that there are limits to credible commitment on the part of ﬁscal
policymakers — otherwise, there would be no risk premium in the ﬁrst place, and delaying
retrenchment until the economy is on a ﬁrm recovery path would likely remain preferable.
The remainder of the current paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model
economy and presents our calibration. Sections 3 and 4 report analytical results and results
from model simulations, respectively. Section 5 concludes.
7Bertola and Drazen (1993) analyze a neoclassical endowment economy where trigger points for ﬁscal
adjustment may alter the comovement between private consumption and government spending, depending on
the level of debt. Sutherland (1997) focuses on tax cuts. Perotti (1999) investigates government spending and
taxes in a model with several frictions.
8In simulations, they ﬁnd that output always falls in the initial periods of a persistent spending cut but
that the eﬀects on output may eventually turn positive during the dynamic adjustment process. For high
levels of debt we obtain even stronger results—notably positive impact eﬀects—as we consider a wider range
of parameterizations and also allow for a nonlinear relationship between the risk premium and the level of
public debt.
9Speciﬁcally, we link the sovereign risk premium to the expected path of public debt (or, alternatively,
future ﬁscal deﬁcits). We thereby abstract from a number of other factors that may also aﬀect the markets’
assessment of sovereign risk, such as the quality of ﬁscal institutions or the composition of the investor base
for government bonds.
52 The model
We analyze the eﬀects of ﬁscal retrenchment within a variant of the New Keynesian model of
a closed economy. We are particularly interested in analyzing how changes in ﬁscal policy can
aﬀect private-sector borrowing conditions through the implied changes in sovereign risk. We
therefore account for the possibility that private-sector borrowing and lending take place in
equilibrium. In order to do so, we rely on the framework developed by C´ urdia and Woodford
(2009) (CW, henceforth), which gives rise to an interest rate spread within an otherwise
standard New Keynesian model. The spread emerges as a result of heterogeneity among
households and because of costly ﬁnancial intermediation. By assuming asymptotic risk
sharing, CW are able to maintain the tractability of the New Keynesian baseline model. We
add to their model a slightly richer speciﬁcation of ﬁscal policy and allow the ﬁscal position
to aﬀect ﬁnancial intermediation. In the following we brieﬂy outline the model and stress the
instances in which we depart from the original CW formulation.
2.1 Households
The economy is populated by a unit measure of households indexed by i ∈ [0,1]. Household
i is of one of two types, indexed by superscript τt(i) ∈ {b,s}. In equilibrium, households of
type τt(i) = b will be “borrowers” and households of type s will be “savers.” Infrequently,
households change their type. In each period, a household’s probability of remaining its
current type is given by δ ∈ (0,1). With probability 1 − δ, the household draws a new type.
With probability πb the household will be a borrower, with probability πs = 1 − πb the




















where ct(i) is an aggregate of household expenditures:
ct(i) =







; θ > 1. (1)
Here ct(j,i) is a diﬀerentiated output good produced by ﬁrm j ∈ [0,1]. ht(i) denotes hours
worked by the household. et is a unit-mean shock to the time-discount factor β ∈ (0,1) and
6ξτ,στ,ψτ and ν are positive parameters.
Households are able to insure against idiosyncratic risk through state-contingent contracts.
Yet the resulting transfer payments are assumed to occur only infrequently, namely only
in those periods in which a household is assigned a new type. Meanwhile households may
borrow or save through ﬁnancial intermediaries. The beginning-of-period wealth of household











Here [Bt−1(i)]+ denotes deposits at ﬁnancial intermediaries at the end of the previous period,
which earn the deposit rate id
t−1; [Bt−1(i)]− denotes debt at ﬁnancial intermediaries that
charge the borrowing rate ib
t−1. In equilibrium, household i is either borrowing or saving. In
the case where it is saving, the household may also hold government debt B
g
t−1(i) ≥ 0.
We depart from CW by assuming that government debt is not riskless: in any period, the
government may honor its debt obligations, in which case ϑt = 0, or it may partially default,
in which case ϑt = ϑdef, with ϑdef ∈ [0,1) being the size of the haircut. i
g
t−1 is the notional
interest rate on government debt. Dint
t are proﬁts from competitive ﬁnancial intermediaries
that are distributed across households in a lump-sum manner. Tt(i) denotes transfers resulting
from state-contingent contracts (which are zero for those households that do not change their
type and are therefore temporarily without access to the payoﬀ scheme implied by asymptotic
risk sharing). Tc
t is a lump-sum transfer that, in case of a sovereign default, compensates bond
holders for losses associated with the sovereign default. Yet the payment is not proportional
to the size of an individual’s holdings of government debt (see Schabert and van Wijnbergen
(2008) for a similar setup). This assumption along with the risk of a haircut drives a wedge
between the risk-free rate, id
t, and the interest rate on sovereign debt, i
g
t.
The end-of-period wealth of household i given by
Bt(i) = At(i) − Ptct(i) + (1 − τw
t )Ptwtht(i) + Dt − T
g
t . (3)
Pt denotes the consumption price index, τw
t is the labor tax rate, and wt is the economy-
wide real wage rate; Dt are proﬁts by intermediary goods producers and −T
g
t are lump-sum
transfers by the government.
7Assuming identical initial wealth for all households, state-contingent contracts ensure that
post-transfer wealth is identical for all households that are selected to change their type. It
is given by
At = [dt−1(1 + id










t denotes government debt in real terms. dt denotes aggregate savings deposited with
intermediaries and bt denotes aggregate private borrowing, both in real terms. The latter
evolves according to
bt = δbt−1(1 + ωt−1)(1 + id

















Intuitively, the accumulation of debt depends on four terms. The ﬁrst term is the last period’s
private debt level times interest (for those households that do not change their type). The
second term, -πbωtbt, is the gain accruing to borrowing households from fraudulent loans
(discussed below). The third term captures whether sovereign indebtedness (suitably adjusted
for the change in household types) falls. In order to reduce sovereign indebtness, current taxes
need to be relatively high, which increases the need for borrowing by borrowers. Alternatively,










> 0, more resources are
made available by savers to borrowers since savers resort more to private sources for storing
value. The last term, on the second line, captures the diﬀerence in consumption levels relative
to the diﬀerence in wage income across household types.
Turning to the intertemporal consumption decisions, note that, as a result of asymptotic risk
sharing, all households of a speciﬁc type have a common marginal utility of real income, λτ
t,







The optimal choices regarding borrowing from and lending to intermediaries, as well as to






























































Across household types, average labor supply, ht = πbhb
t + (1 − πb)hs
































s . Finally, for future reference we deﬁne
λt = πbλb
t + (1 − πb)λs
t (15)
as the average marginal utility of real income across types.
2.2 Financial intermediaries
Saving and borrowing across households of diﬀerent types takes place through perfectly com-
petitive ﬁnancial intermediaries. As in CW, we assume that an interest rate spread emerges,
because ﬁnancial intermediation requires resources, Ξtbt, and because in each period a frac-
tion of loans, χt, cannot be recovered, irrespective of the characteristics of borrowers (due
to, e.g., fraud). Moreover, deposits, dt, are assumed to be riskless and intermediaries are
9assumed to collect the largest quantity of deposits that can be repaid from the proceeds of
the loans that it originates, that is, (1 + id
t)dt = (1 + id)bt. The cash ﬂow in period t of a
ﬁnancial intermediary is thus given by dt − bt − χtbt − Ξtbt. Using ωt to deﬁne the spread
between lending and deposit rates, we have






Substituting dt = (1 + ωt)bt, and choosing bt to maximize the proﬁts of the intermediary
yields the ﬁrst-order condition for loan origination
ωt = χt + Ξt. (17)
In departing from CW, we assume that either χt or Ξt depends on sovereign risk—to capture
increased strain on the ﬁnancial system and, hence, the increased diﬃculties in monitoring
and enforcing loan contracts in an economy under ﬁscal strain. Conceptually related is the
notion that in case of sovereign default, the government diverts funds from the repayment of
borrowers, see Mendoza and Yue (2010).
Costs χtbt and Ξtbt diﬀer in that only the latter are assumed to enter the economy’s resource
constraint. For the linearized version of the model, used in Section 3, we let loan origination
costs be covered by χt > 0, and set Ξt = 0, which facilitates deriving analytical results. For
the dynamic simulations in Section 4 we set χt = 0 and let Ξt > 0. Speciﬁcally, we assume
that either
χt = χψ[(1 + i
g
t)/(1 + id
t)]αψ − 1 and Ξt = 0, (18)
or
χt = 0 and Ξt = χψ[(1 + i
g
t)/(1 + id
t)]αψ − 1, (19)
where parameter χψ > 0 is used to scale the private spread in the steady state, and αψ
measures the strength of the spillover of the (log) sovereign risk premium to the (log) private
risk premium. Finally, transfers from intermediaries to households include loans that are not
recovered by the intermediaries such that Dint
t = Pt(ωtbt − Ξt bt).
102.3 Firms
There is a continuum of ﬁrms j ∈ [0,1], each of which produces a diﬀerentiated good on the
basis of the following technology
yt(j) = zth(j)1/φ, (20)
where zt is an aggregate productivity shock. In each period only a fraction (1−α) of ﬁrms is
able to reoptimize its prices. Firms that do not reoptimize adjust their price by the steady-
state rate of inﬂation, Π. Prices are set in period t to maximize expected discounted future




































































Finally, proﬁts distributed to households are given by Dt =
  1
0 Pt(j)yt(j) − Ptwtht(j)dj. Or,
in equilibrium, Dt = Pt
 








PT , taking into account that demand for
product j is given by the demand function yt(j) = yt(Pt(j)/Pt)
−θ, where Pt(j) denotes the price of good j
and yt is aggregate output.
112.4 Government
Real government debt evolves as follows
b
g


















where gt denotes government spending. Below we will consider alternative assumptions re-
garding the law of motion for government spending. As is customary, throughout the paper,
we assume that the expenditure share of each particular diﬀerentiated good in government
spending is the same as the share of that good in private consumption. By assumption,
transfers Tc
t ensure that a sovereign default is neutral ex post in regard to any distributional
consequences and the debt level. That is, under our assumptions, a sovereign default does





























t wtht + T
g
t /Pt (27)
be the part of taxes that is related to the business cycle and to stabilization policy, we assume
(trt − t) =
 




, φT,y ≥ 0, φT,bg > 0. (28)
Throughout the paper, we assume that φT,b is large enough so as to eventually stabilize public
debt.11
While actual default is neutral in the sense described above, the probability of a default is
crucial for the pricing of government debt (i
g
t). And this probability of default – through
ﬁnancial intermediation – does matter for real activity.12 Yet a fully speciﬁed model of
11We will also, for a large part, assume that the labor tax rate remains constant, τ
w
t = τ
w, and will be
explicit when we consider simulations in which that is not going to be the case.
12This implication of our setup is in line with evidence reported by Yeyati and Panizza (2011). Investigating
12sovereign default is beyond the scope of the present paper. In this regard the literature has
pursued two distinct approaches. First, following Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Arellano (2008)
and others have modeled default as a strategic decision of the sovereign. Second, and more
recently, Bi and Leeper (2010) and Juessen et al. (2011), consider default as the consequence
of the government’s inability to raise the funds necessary to honor its debt obligations. Under
both approaches, the probability of sovereign default is tightly and nonlinearly linked to the
level of public debt.
In the current paper we operationalize sovereign default by appealing to the notion of a
ﬁscal limit in a manner similar to Bi and Leeper (2010). Whenever the debt level rises
above the ﬁscal limit, a default will occur. The ﬁscal limit is determined stochastically
capturing the uncertainty that surrounds the political process in the context of sovereign
default. Speciﬁcally, we assume that in each period the limit will be drawn from a generalized
beta distribution with parameters αbg, βbg, and b
g,max
. As a result, the ex ante probability of
a default, pt, at a certain level of sovereign indebtedness, b
g
t, will be given by the cumulative














denotes the upper range of the support for the debt level in terms of the






ϑdef with probability pt,
0 with probability 1 − pt.
(30)
Turning, last, to monetary policy, throughout the paper we assume that monetary policy
follows a Taylor-type interest rate rule that also seeks to insulate aggregate economic activity
from ﬂuctuations in spreads, at least to some degree. In particular, we assume:
log(1 + i
d,∗
t ) = log(1 + id) + φΠ log(Πt/Π) − φω log((1 + ωt)/(1 + ω)). (31)
Here, i
d,∗
t , marks the target level for the deposit rate id
t, and φΠ > 1, φω > 0. In deep
output growth in a large number of episodes of sovereign defaults on the basis of quarterly data, they ﬁnd
that the output costs of a default materialize in the run-up to defaults rather than at the time when a default
actually takes place.
13recessions, the target level and the actual deposit rate can diverge. The reason is that in
implementing rule (31), the central bank relies on steering the riskless interest rate id
t, which
cannot fall below zero. Therefore, id
t = id∗
t can be implemented provided that id
t ≥ 0. Other-
wise, id
t = 0. As a result, an increase in the spread ωt cannot be oﬀset if monetary policy is
constrained in lowering the policy rate.13
2.5 Market clearing and equilibrium




ct(i)di + gt + Ξbt = πbcb
t + πscs
t + gt + Ξbt (32)






In order to characterize the equilibrium, we use equations (5)-(15), which characterize the
solution to the household problem; equations (16)-(19), which characterize ﬁnancial inter-
mediation; equations (21)-(25), which characterize optimal price setting behavior; equations
(26) - (30), which characterize the behavior of ﬁscal policy, and the assumption about the
evolution of labor taxes, the interest rate target rule (31) and the lower-bound constraint, and
ﬁnally the good market clearing conditions (32) and (33). For given exogenous realizations






















13Here we focus on a simple representation of monetary policy. In the current model environment, monetary
policy could – in principle – take a much more complicated form. For example, monetary policy in a lower
bound situation could promise low future real rates to help the economy ease out of the lower bound situation;
see Eggertsson and Woodford (2003). This would not only increase output relative to the current interest rate
rule (31), but it would also raise tax revenues and would therefore, to some extent, ease the ﬁscal strain. The
question of the extent to which central banks can credibly engage in such complicated forward guidance is not
settled, however.
142.6 Calibration
In order to solve the model numerically, we assign parameter values on the basis of observa-
tions for U.S. data and on the basis of the relationship between sovereign risk, private-sector
spreads, and the debt level across a range of countries. A time period in the model is one
quarter.
In regard to monetary policy, we assume an average inﬂation rate of 2 percent per year.
The coeﬃcient on inﬂation in the Taylor rule is set to a customary value of φΠ = 1.5. We
entertain diﬀerent values for parameter φω, the response of monetary policy to the interest
spread below. We will discuss the parameterization in the respective sections.
The steady-state level of government spending (consumption and investment) relative to the
size of GDP is g/y = 0.2. The level of gross public debt in the steady state is set to 60 percent
of annual GDP. These values are broadly in line with U.S. averages over the last 20 years. In
the baseline scenario, we set distortionary tax rates to zero and assume that the adjustment
of taxes over the business cycle and in response to the debt level is achieved through lump-
sum taxes. This assumption allows us to focus on the main channels of transmission in a
transparent way while accounting for a feedback from economic activity to the ﬁscal outlook.14
We assume that taxes react to debt suﬃciently strongly (φT,y large enough) so as to ensure
that the debt level remains bounded throughout and that φT,y = 0.34. This value is reasonable
for the U.S., but at the lower end of estimates for other OECD countries; compare Girouard
and Andr´ e (2005).15
With regard to the preference parameters, we set the curvature of the disutility of work to
ν = 1/1.9, in line with the arguments provided by Hall (2009) regarding plausible values
for the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. We set an elasticity of demand of θ = 7.6 so as to
generate a gross price markup of  p = 1.15, which is in the range of customary values used
in the literature. Finally, for our baseline scenario, we assume that the average intertemporal
elasticity of substitution σ = c/y, where σ := πb   (cb/y)   σb + πs   (cs/y)   σs. Had the model
a representative household, this would correspond to the case of log-utility. Further, we
14Below we explore the sensitivity of our results and also consider a distortionary tax rate on labor.
15These authors follow the OECD’s disaggregated approach, distinguishing four sources of tax revenues:
personal income tax, Social Security contributions, corporate income tax and indirect taxes; in addition the
estimates take into account unemployment-related transfers. For all ﬁve categories, the output elasticity is
decomposed into i) the tax-base elasticity of a particular revenue/expenditure type and ii) the output elasticity
of the tax/expenditure base in question. These components are quantiﬁed on the basis of diﬀerent estimation
strategies and combined to compute the output semi-elasticity of the budget.
15assume that aggregate hours worked in the steady state are given by h = 1/3. We choose the
relative values of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of the two types of households
(σb and σs) and of the scaling parameters of the disutility of work (ψb and ψs) such that the
linearized model can be represented in the canonical three-equation New Keynesian format.
This representation allows us to derive a number of analytical results in the next section.
Importantly, under this calibration only the current value of the interest rate spread enters
the dynamic IS-relationship and the New Keynesian Phillips curve. In addition, the evolution
of output and inﬂation is independent of the level of private debt. Appendix F spells out in
detail the conditions under which this representation is valid. Speciﬁcally, given the other
parameter values, we set σb/σs = 0.53 and ψb/ψs = 0.82. We explore to sensitivity of our
results with respect to these assumptions through numerical simulations in Section 4.
We target a ratio of private debt to annual GDP, b/4y, of 80 percent, in line with Great Mod-
eration averages for the U.S. More precisely, the ﬁgure refers to nonﬁnancial, nonmortgage,
nongovernment credit market debt outstanding recorded in the U.S. ﬂow of funds accounts.
The same target is used by C´ urdia and Woodford (2009). Along with the market clearing
condition, this determines scaling parameters ξb and ξs. Next, as in C´ urdia and Woodford
(2009), we assume that households change type on average every 40 quarters, giving δ = 0.975.
This implies that the average time during which a speciﬁc type is without access to payoﬀ
streams from asymptotic risk sharing is 10 years.
A central element in our calibration is the share of borrowers in the economy, πb. This
determines the share of economic activity that is aﬀected by an increase in the spread and
therefore deserves some discussion. One possible calibration would refer to the (U.S.) Survey
of Consumer Finances. Averaging over the latest surveys (1998, 2001, 2004, and 2007), the
share of U.S. families that hold some kind of debt is 76 percent; compare Aizcorbe et al.
(2003) and Bucks et al. (2009). This suggests a value of πb = 0.76, and of πs = 0.24.
However, loans secured by the primary residence make up a large share of that debt. This
suggests that such a calibration for πb might overstate the importance of borrowing and the
related eﬀect that an increase in borrowing spreads could have on economic activity. Another
metric, also from the Survey of Consumer Finances, that is more directly related to the
notion of “borrowers” and “savers” in our model is that on average 57 percent of families in
the survey report that – over the year preceding each survey date – they have been spending
16less than their income, that is, they have saved. This suggests a value for πb of 1 − 0.57, or
πb = 0.43. That said, both of the aforementioned ﬁgures do not explicitly take into account
the borrowing by ﬁrms in the economy (other than by single-owner ﬁrms). To the extent that
households in our model own ﬁrms and also make the intertemporal decisions for these ﬁrms,
any purely household-based measure of indebtedness is likely to underestimate the degree
of indebtedness and thereby the importance of the borrowing spread. In particular, using
the same measure of private borrowing as above (nonﬁnancial, nonmortgage, nongovernment
credit market debt), 50 percent of private borrowing is accounted for by corporations rather
than by households. In our baseline calibration, and in order to account for this, we set
πb = (1 − 0.17)   0.43 + 0.17   1 = 0.53. This formula hypothetically divides households into
consumption entities that have a certain share of indebtedness and investment entities, all
of which have debt. In the calculations, 0.17 is the share of nonresidential private domestic
ﬁxed and inventory investment in private domestic economic activity.
In regard to the normal spread between deposit and lending rates, we target a steady-state
value of 2.1 percent (annualized), in line with commercial and industrial loan rate spreads
in the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Terms of Business Lending. This pins down parameter
χψ. The steady-state level for the central bank’s target interest rate, id, is set to 4.5 percent
annualized, from which the time discount factor, β, follows.
Next, in regard to production parameters, we set φ = 1, implying a linear production func-
tion. We furthermore target a unit value for steady-state output, setting productivity, z,
accordingly. We set parameter α = 0.9 in order to generate a slope of the Phillips curve in
line with the empirical evidence.16
Finally, it remains to determine the parameters that govern the spillover from sovereign risk
premiums to private-sector spreads. Actual haircuts in case of a sovereign default show a
large variation; see Panizza et al. (2009) and Moody’s Investors Service (2011). ϑdef = 0.5
appears to be a reasonable average value. In regard to the speciﬁcation of the ﬁscal limit,
we seek to replicate the relationship between the sovereign risk premium and public debt
shown in Figure 2. The ﬁgure plots CDS spreads of industrialized economies against the
level of projected gross public debt (relative to GDP). The projections are taken from the
16Speciﬁcally, our parameterization implies a slope coeﬃcient of κ = 0.012. Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999) report
estimates for the slope of the Phillips curve, given by (1−βθ)(1−θ)/θ, in the range between 0.007 and 0.047.
More recently, Altig et al. (2010) report an estimate of 0.014.



















































































































































General Government Gross Debt
(percent of GDP, forecast for 2011 and 2015)
Fitted risk premium
Notes: The ﬁgure shows 5-year sovereign CDS spreads for industrialized countries against
forecasts for end of 2011 gross general government debt/GDP (blue circles) and end of
2015 debt to GDP (green triangles). The countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Nor-
way, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States.
Note: Excludes Japan. The forecasts are taken from the IMF World Economic Outlook
April/2011.
IMF World Economic Outlook in April 2011. The blue dots show projections for the end of
2011. For comparison, the ﬁgure also plots IMF forecasts for the debt to GDP ratio by the
end of 2015. For the countries shown in the ﬁgure, CDS spreads are systematically higher
the higher the level of projected gross public debt.17 In fact, the risk premium appears to
rise disproportionately as the debt level rises. We choose parameters αbg = 3.70, βbg = 0.54,
and b
g,max
= 2.56 to match this empirical relationship. The black solid line displays the
steady-state relationship between debt levels and the sovereign risk premium thus implied.
Regarding the spillovers from sovereign to private-sector risk, Figure 1 is suggestive of a
sovereign risk channel that runs from sovereign spreads to spreads in the household and
corporate sector. Of course, there may be other reasons for the observed comovement, too.
17For a systematic empirical analysis of the relationship between ﬁscal variables and yields on government
bonds; see, among others, Reinhart and Sack (2000), Ardagna et al. (2007), Baldacci et al. (2008), Haugh et al.
(2009), Baldacci and Kumar (2010), Laubach (2009) or Borgy et al. (2011). Ardagna et al. (2007) explicitly
focus on possible nonlinearities in the relationship and ﬁnd that bond rates rise disproportionately for very high
levels of debt. Note, however, that sovereign CDS spreads may not only be driven by ﬁscal “fundamentals,”
but that these may compensate for factors other than default risk as well, from which we do abstract in the
following. Rather, here we focus on the fact that high current and/or projected debt is consistently found to
be a key determinant of government ﬁnancing costs.
18In the present paper, however, we abstract from these and interpret the comovement as caused
by sovereign risk. In regard to αψ, for euro area sovereigns and a sample of large, publicly
traded companies headquartered in these countries, Harjes (2011) ﬁnds that of a 100-basis-
point increase in sovereign spreads, about 50 to 60 basis points are passed on to private ﬁrms.
As our baseline, we therefore set αψ = 0.55. For the simulations that we will show, we view
this as a lower bound for two reasons: ﬁrst, it is based on credit-spreads of companies that
are large and therefore do have access to the international credit market. Indeed, many of the
companies in the sample are internationally well-diversiﬁed. The spillover eﬀects likely are
larger for smaller – and less-diversiﬁed – companies that rely on local bank-based ﬁnancing.
Second, Figure 1 suggests that the comovement is considerably stronger in countries that face
more ﬁscal strain than it is for countries with a more stable ﬁscal position. In that sense,
the baseline value of αψ = 0.55 may understate the strength of the sovereign-risk channel
for highly indebted countries, and we also consider higher values as we move through the
simulations in the paper.
3 Analytical results on the eﬀects of ﬁscal retrenchment
We now turn to an analysis of the eﬀects of ﬁscal retrenchment within the model outlined
above. Our particular interest is in how the sovereign-risk channel aﬀects the transmission
of ﬁscal policy. A key aspect concerns the ability of monetary policy to oﬀset the eﬀect of
sovereign risk on interest rates in the private sector. To capture this aspect we consider
a scenario where monetary policy is possibly constrained by the ZLB. Before turning to
simulation results for the full model, the current section focuses on a special case for which
we are able to obtain analytical solutions. For this case, we assume that the probability of
sovereign default depends on the expected primary deﬁcit, rather than on the level of debt.
3.1 A special case of the model
In this section, we focus on a ﬁrst-order approximation of the equilibrium conditions around
the deterministic steady state. The aggregate equilibrium dynamics of the model can be
represented by a variant of the New Keynesian Phillips curve and a dynamic IS-relationship.
19The former relates inﬂation to expected inﬂation and output as well as government purchases:
  Πt = βEt  Πt+1 + κy˜ yt − κg˜ gt, (34)
where κy = κ(ν + ¯ σ−1) and κg = κ¯ σ−1, where κ =
(1−α)(1−αβ)
α .18 In terms of notation,
˜ yt = yt − y, ˜ gt = gt − g,   Πt = log(Πt/Π), where variables without a time subscript refer to a
steady-state value.
The dynamic IS-relationship links output to real government spending and the eﬀective real
interest rate through
˜ yt − ˜ gt = Et˜ yt+1 − Et˜ gt+1 − ¯ σ
 
  id
t + (πb + sΩ)   ωt − Et  Πt+1 + Γt
 
, (35)
where   ωt := log((1+ωt)/(1+ω)),  id
t := log((1+id
t)/(1+id)), and Γt := Et log(et+1)−log(et).
From the IS-relationship, it is clear that ﬂuctuations in the private-sector spread can inﬂuence
economic activity if these are not neutralized by monetary policy. The degree to which the
private-sector spread, holding the policy rate constant, does aﬀect economic activity in turn is
determined by parameters πb + sΩ. As discussed in C´ urdia and Woodford (2009), parameter
sΩ := πbπs(σb cb/y − σs cs/y)/¯ σ indicates the extent to which interest rate increases aﬀect
the aggregate demand by borrowers more adversely than that of savers. In our calibration,
cb > cs and sΩ > 0.
For monetary policy, equation (31) implies that in deviations from steady state
  id
t = max{φπ  Πt − φω  ωt,−log(1 + id)}. (36)
For the analytical results, we focus on the case φω = (πb + sΩ), so that in normal times the
central bank fully sterilizes the eﬀect of the sovereign risk premium on aggregate economic
outcomes, as is borne out by the IS equation (35). Yet, monetary policy may not always
be able to do so. In particular, in the following we assume that there are shocks to the
time-discount factor, Γt, which reduce private expenditure and inﬂation by enough to push
the policy rate to the ZLB. As a result monetary policy becomes constrained and unable to
absorb an increase in the interest rate spread. In the following, we follow Christiano et al.
18Here, as in the following linearizations, we abstract from ﬂuctuations in productivity, zt.
20(2011) and Woodford (2011) in assuming that these shocks follow a Markov structure: they
persist into the next period with probability   ∈ [0,1).19 Given that there are no endogenous
state variables in the special case of our model that we discuss in the current section, the
expected duration of the recession, that is, the expected length of the ZLB episode, is given
by 1/(1− ). Once the shock ceases to persist, the economy immediately reverts to the steady
state.
Finally, as indicated above, we make a further simplifying assumption in this section that
allows us to obtain analytical results. Namely, we assume that the probability of sovereign
default – and thereby the sovereign-risk premium – depends on the expected primary deﬁcit
rather than on the level of public debt as in the full model. As a result, the interest rate spread
depends on the expected deﬁcit as well. In particular, we postulate a linearized relationship
of the form
  ̟t = ξEt(˜ gt+1 − φT,y˜ yt+1), (37)
where, in order to ease the burden on notation, we have deﬁned the spread that enters the
IS-relationship over and above the riskless deposit rate as   ̟t := (πb+sΩ)  ωt. Parameter ξ ≥ 0
indicates the extent to which ﬁscal strain – as measured by primary deﬁcits – spills over to
private-sector spreads.
3.2 The size of the spillover
To appreciate our results below, it is useful to discuss the range of plausible values for ξ in
equation (37), which — through a sequence of back-of-the-envelope calculations — links to
the fundamental parameters of the model as follows. Let ξ′ be the slope of the risk premium
with respect to the deﬁcit (or alternatively debt) at a speciﬁc debt level, evaluated in the
steady state. Our assumptions regarding the sovereign spread in Section 2, in particular
equation (29), imply that
ξ′ = αψ
(πb + sΩ)ϑdef




















19Speciﬁcally, we assume a temporary increase in the eﬀective discount factor, triggered by 0 < et = eL < 1
while at the ZLB, so Γt = µlog(eL) − log(eL) = −(1 − µ)log(eL) > 0.
21Table 1: Quantifying parameter ξ
ξ by length of ZLB (qtrs)
debt/GDP ξ′ 6 7 8
60 percent 0.0005 0.004 0.005 0.005
90 percent 0.0016 0.014 0.015 0.017
110 percent 0.0030 0.025 0.028 0.031
130 percent 0.0051 0.042 0.047 0.052
140 percent 0.0065 0.054 0.060 0.066
150 percent 0.0083 0.068 0.076 0.084
Notes: The table presents estimates for the slope of the average private interest rate with
respect to the deﬁcit, ξ, for diﬀerent average lengths (in quarters) of the lower bound
situation and for diﬀerent debt/GDP ratios. The entries in the columns “ξ by length of
ZLB (qtrs)” are based on the formula ξ =
1+µ(1−µ)
µ(1−µ) ξ
′ that is explained in detail in the
main text and Appendix G.
The ﬁrst column of Table 1 reports the resulting values for ξ′ for alternative debt levels using
the calibration of the ﬁscal limit distribution discussed in Section 2.6.
These values appear to be fairly small. It needs to be borne in mind, however, that the
relationship in equation (37) links the interest rate spread and the expected deﬁcit, whereas
the full model implies a link between the interest rate spread and the expected level of debt
— and therefore the accumulated deﬁcits. The values for ξ′ are thus likely to understate
the size of the response of the interest rate spread to the ﬁscal situation. In particular, an
appropriate mapping from the slope of the risk premium into the simpliﬁed model environment
would appear to need to take into account the horizon over which deﬁcits accumulate. The
following expression is meant to capture this eﬀect for empirically reasonable values of   > 0.5
(so the lower bound is expected to be binding for at least two periods):20
ξ =
1 +  (1 −  )
 (1 −  )
ξ′. (38)
The columns under “ξ by length of ZLB” of Table 1 report the corresponding values of ξ for
diﬀerent initial debt levels if the ZLB has an expected duration of six, seven or eight quarters.
These calculations suggest that a value of ξ of about 0.1 cannot be ruled out if the initial
level of debt is high and the recessionary shock is persistent. In particular, Figure 1 suggests
that the spillovers can be notably stronger for countries that do face ﬁscal strain than for
the average country. A bigger spillover parameter, αψ, would scale up linearly the entries in
20Appendix G presents a more detailed motivation of the formula.
22Table 1.
3.3 Sovereign-risk channel and equilibrium determinacy
In our baseline scenario the level of government spending is determined exogenously. For this
case, we ﬁnd that the presence of a sovereign-risk channel alters the determinacy properties of
the model while the ZLB is binding. In the following, we establish restrictions on parameters
that ensure that the equilibrium is (locally) determinate.21
Proposition 1 In the economy summarized by equations (34) – (37), let Γt take on a positive
value Γ > 0 in period zero, and remain such with probability   in each subsequent period, until
it reverts to Γt = 0 forever. Furthermore, let the value of Γt be large enough that the lower
bound is binding initially. There is a unique bounded equilibrium if and only if
a) a < 1/(β ), and b) (1 − β )(1 − a) >  ¯ σκy,
where a :=   +  ξφT,y¯ σ and κy := κ[ν + 1/¯ σ].
Proof. See Appendix B.
In the absence of an endogenous risk premium, ξ = 0, as in Christiano et al. (2011) and Wood-
ford (2011), condition a) is always satisﬁed. So there will be a unique bounded equilibrium
if and only if condition b) holds. If ξ = 0, condition b) is given by (1 − β )(1 −  ) >  ¯ σκy.
The previous literature has shown that the set of “fundamental” parameters for which this
condition holds is the larger (i) the less persistent the lower bound situation (in our parame-
terization, the smaller  ), (ii) the lower the interest sensitivity of demand (the smaller ¯ σ) and
(iii) the ﬂatter the Phillips curve (the smaller κy). Relative to these ﬁndings, our analysis
shows that the range of parameters for which the equilibrium is determinate actually shrinks
in the presence of a sovereign-risk channel. Namely, with ξ > 0, condition a) is violated if
either the interest rate spread is suﬃciently responsive to the deﬁcit or if the tax revenue is
21Here we focus on local determinacy once the economy has reached the lower bound. Another strand of
the literature examines global determinacy in the New Keynesian model and is concerned with preventing
the economy from falling into a liquidity trap in the ﬁrst place. Benhabib et al. (2002), for example, propose
switching to a non-Ricardian ﬁscal policy. These mechanisms will rule out liquidity traps by making the low-
inﬂation steady state ﬁscally unsustainable. Mertens and Ravn (2010) study the eﬃcacy of ﬁscal policy in
belief-driven equilibria.
23suﬃciently responsive to output (φT,y is large enough). Note that the same parameters are
also key determinants for whether condition b) is satisﬁed.22
It is instructive to contrast this result for the baseline scenario with a situation where govern-
ment spending adjusts endogenously to output while the economy is at the ZLB. The following
proposition summarizes the conditions for the existence of a unique bounded equilibrium.
Proposition 2 In the economy speciﬁed in Proposition 1, let government spending ˜ gt take on
a value of ˜ gt = ϕ˜ yt, when the economy is at the ZLB, and ˜ gt = 0 otherwise. Suppose further
that ϕ < 1. Deﬁne a∗ :=  + ξφ∗
T,y¯ σ∗; κ∗
y = κy −ϕκg; φ∗
T,y := φT,y −ϕ, and ¯ σ∗ = ¯ σ/(1−ϕ).
There exists a unique bounded equilibrium if and only if:
1. with a∗ > 0
a) a∗ < 1/(β ), and b) (1 − β )(1 − a∗) >  ¯ σ∗κ∗
y,
[ and if ϕ > 1], c) (1 + β )(1 + a∗) > − ¯ σ∗κ∗
y
2. with a∗ < 0:
a) (1 + β )(1 + a∗) > − ¯ σ∗κ∗
y and b) (1 − β )(1 − a∗) >  ¯ σ∗κ∗
y.
Proof. See Appendix B.
To appreciate the implications, consider ﬁrst the possibility that there is no sovereign-risk
channel (ξ = 0). In this case the range of parameters for which the equilibrium is determinate
is larger if spending is countercyclical (ϕ < 0). Interestingly, however, with an endogenous risk
22The analytical results in Proposition 1 do not depend on the precise size of the response to inﬂation, φπ,
once the economy has left the lower bound (apart from whether the parameter satisﬁes the Taylor principle).
At ﬁrst glance this seems to contradict the results in Davig and Leeper (2007). Yet, these authors look at an
economy with monetary regime changes in which the Taylor rule satisﬁes the Taylor principle in one regime
but not the other. They show that the equilibrium may remain locally determinate in both regimes in such a
setup if the “passive regime” is not too persistent and if—at the same time—in the “active” regime, monetary
policy is suﬃciently responsive to inﬂation. This suggests that the monetary response to inﬂation should ﬁgure
in the determinacy conditions. Their calculations, however, explicitly exclude the possibility that the passive
regime is a lower bound scenario in which monetary policy does not react at all to inﬂation. Rather they
focus on the case in which in both regimes there is some reaction of monetary policy to inﬂation. If one of
the regimes is a lower bound regime, the precise size of the response to inﬂation in the active regime does not
feature in the determinacy considerations.
24premium, the opposite may hold. More precisely, if ξ > 0 and if in addition the conditions of
Item 1 of Proposition 2 hold, then subject to some limits on the elasticity of taxes with respect
to output, namely, φT,y < 1 − κν
(1−βµ)ξ, the range of fundamental parameters for which the
equilibrium is determinate is at least as large with a procyclical spending response, ϕ ∈ (0,1),
as without any response, and can be larger. Note that this case is the more likely the less
elastic the tax revenue responds to the state of the economy (the smaller φT,y), and the more
responsive the interest rate spread to the deﬁcit (the larger ξ). Put diﬀerently, a procyclical
ﬁscal stance may reduce the risk of equilibrium indeterminacy (see Appendix B, corollary 6
for details).23
This deserves some discussion. While previous work has focused on the case in which sovereign
debt and a rising risk premium imply explosive debt, we consider a situation in which debt
ultimately will always be stabilized, through one-oﬀ tax measures. In such an environment,
we ﬁnd that an economy with an endogenous risk premium can be prone to belief-driven
equilibria. At the same time, spending cuts during recessions may actually help to anchor
expectations on a unique equilibrium. To see why, assume that during the ZLB period agents
expect some drop in output. A drop in output means less tax revenue and, in the absence of a
ﬁscal response, higher deﬁcits, and thus, ultimately, a higher interest rate spread. As this rise
in the interest rate spread cannot be oﬀset by monetary action at the ZLB, it immediately
raises the real interest rate. As a result, expectations of negative output developments can
become self-fulﬁlling in high-debt economies, with a high and rising interest rate spread
weighing heavily on output, thus conﬁrming agents’ beliefs in equilibrium. In contrast, a
procyclical ﬁscal stance may be suﬃcient to prevent an adverse expectational shock from
conﬁrming itself, because expected spending cuts would oﬀset the expected decline in tax
revenues triggered by a decline in output.
For the baseline parameterization, Figure 3 illustrates the results of Propositions 1 and 2.
Each panel of the ﬁgure displays results for a diﬀerent value of   implying, from left to right,
an expected duration of the ZLB episode of 6, 7 and 8 quarters, respectively. For diﬀerent
values of the slope of the risk-premium ξ, measured on the horizontal axis, and the response
of government spending to output ϕ, measured on the vertical axis, we evaluate whether a
23Clearly, we here focus on very simple ﬁscal and monetary rules in order to maintain the analytical tractabil-
ity. More complicated rules that would make future monetary or ﬁscal behavior depend on past developments
might, in principle, help overcome problems of indeterminacy.
25Figure 3: Determinacy regions with endogenous response of government spending
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Notes: Determinacy regions with endogenous response of government spending to economic activity during a deep
recession. Grey areas mark parameterizations that imply determinacy. y-axis: response of government spending
to output, ϕ (˜ gt = ϕ˜ yt). x-axis: response of the interest rate spread to the deﬁcit, ξ. From left to right: ZLB is
expected to bind for 6, 7, or 8 quarters (or, µ = 5/6,6/7,7/8).
unique equilibrium exists. Grey areas indicate determinacy regions, while white areas indicate
equilibrium indeterminacy. In case the expected duration at the ZLB is long (right panel) and
the slope of the risk premium steep, we ﬁnd that there may be no countercyclical spending
policy – of the simple form analyzed here – that ensures determinacy.
On a ﬁnal note, in this section we have made the risk-premium depend on the expected deﬁcit,
as shown in (37). This conforms to the notion that sovereign spreads depend on the expected
ﬁscal position going forward. Quantitatively, however, the results would be very similar if we
had, instead, assumed that the sovereign spread depended on the current period’s deﬁcit.
3.4 Output eﬀects of spending cuts
In the following we focus on the eﬀects of exogenous spending cuts and limit our analysis
to parameterizations for which a stable and unique equilibrium exists. Eventually we are
interested in understanding how the eﬀect of cuts in government spending depends on the
strength of the sovereign-risk channel. In the simpliﬁed model setup that we consider at the
moment, the latter is captured by parameter ξ. Since monetary policy may neutralize the
eﬀects of the sovereign-risk channel outside the ZLB episode, parameter   plays a key role in
our analysis as well.
26For analytical convenience, we analyze the eﬀects of spending cuts during the ZLB episode. In
doing so, we follow Woodford (2011) and Christiano et al. (2011) and assume that government
spending takes on a value that diﬀers from its steady-state level only while the economy is at
the ZLB, namely, a level of ˜ gt = gL. Otherwise government spending is set to its steady-state
level.
Proposition 3 Under the conditions spelled out by Proposition 1 (which ensure that a unique
bounded equilibrium exists), let government spending take on a value of gL whenever the lower
bound is binding, and 0 otherwise. As before, deﬁne a =  + ξφT,y¯ σ, and b =  + ¯ σξ. Then,
while the economy is at the ZLB, output is given by
yL = ϑr(log(1 + id) − Γ) + ϑg gL,
where
ϑr =
¯ σ(1 − β )




(1 − β )(1 − b) −  ¯ σκg
(1 − β )(1 − a) −  ¯ σκy
. (40)
Proof. See Appendix B.
Note that ϑg provides a measure for the government spending multiplier on output at the
ZLB. It is characterized in more detail by Corollary 7 in Appendix B.5. Speciﬁcally, under
the determinacy conditions established above, equation (40) implies that the multiplier is
positive if and only if
(1 −  ) −
 ¯ σκg
1 − β 
>  ξ¯ σ. (41)
If this condition is satisﬁed, a spending cut at the ZLB will reduce output. If ξ = 0, this
will always be the case; moreover, the government spending multiplier will be strictly larger
than one; see Christiano et al. (2011) and Woodford (2011). In contrast, if ξ > 0, the
government spending multiplier at the ZLB may actually be negative, such that spending
cuts raise output.
The left panel of Figure 4 illustrates this result graphically. It displays the output eﬀect of a
government spending cut during the ZLB episode for diﬀerent levels of ﬁscal strain, measured
27Figure 4: Eﬀects of early retrenchment
Output Deﬁcit Interest rate spread
Notes: The ﬁgure shows the eﬀects of a unit cut in government spending for the length of the ZLB episode. Eﬀect
on output (left panel), on the deﬁcit (center: negative means deﬁcit falls) and on the interest rate spread (right).
On the axes: responsiveness of interest spread to expected deﬁcit, ξ, and expected duration of ZLB episode:
1/(1 − µ). Only parameterizations that imply determinacy are shown. For better readability, multipliers and
deﬁcits were capped at the maximum level indicated in the charts.
by alternative values for ξ, and for diﬀerent assumptions regarding the expected length of the
recession, as measured by alternative values of 1/(1 −  ). The other parameters underlying
these computations remain as laid out earlier. In the same ﬁgure we also show the response
of the budget deﬁcit (middle panel) and the interest rate spread (right panel)
Output’s response to a spending cut depends on both dimensions under consideration. Con-
sider ﬁrst the case where ξ = 0, that is, a situation when there is no sovereign-risk channel. In
this case, a spending cut induces a sizeable decline of output. In fact, for an expected duration
of the ZLB episode of eight quarters, the government spending multiplier on output reaches a
value of about 3, a result recently stressed in Christiano et al. (2011). The underlying mech-
anism is well understood: the deﬂationary eﬀect of spending cuts cannot be accommodated
by a reduction in policy rates and thus triggers an increase in the real interest rate, which
crowds out private demand. The eﬀect is stronger, the longer the expected duration of the
ZLB, as private demand is determined by the expected path of current and future short-term
real interest rates.
Turning to the sovereign-risk channel, we focus ﬁrst on the case where the ZLB is expected to
be short, such that monetary policy is expected to be constrained for four quarters only. In
28this case, as the interest rate spread becomes more responsive to the deﬁcit, that is as ξ takes
on bigger values, the multiplier tends to decline, that is, output tends to fall by less. Yet the
role of the sovereign-risk channel is clearly limited, even for very high values of ξ. This is due
to the fact that monetary policy is expected to be able to oﬀset the eﬀect of sovereign risk
on private interest rates in the near future.
However, if monetary policy is expected to be constrained for an extended period, the
sovereign-risk channel has a strong bearing on the ﬁscal transmission mechanism. In fact,
if ξ and   both take on high values, the sign of the output multiplier changes. A spending
cut during the ZLB episode then is expansionary. To understand this ﬁnding, it is useful to
consider the response of the deﬁcit and of the risk premium. Note that for most parameteri-
zations, a cut in government spending reduces the deﬁcit (see also Erceg and Lind´ e (2010b)).
If ﬁscal strain is pervasive, this leads to a considerable decline in the risk premium. This, in
turn, reduces the interest rate spread, stimulates private demand and tax revenues—setting
in motion a virtuous cycle of a further decline in interest rate spreads, increased economic
activity and a further improvement of the ﬁscal outlook.
In sum, we ﬁnd in our simpliﬁed model setup a possibly important role for the sovereign-
risk channel. In fact, ﬁscal retrenchment may be expansionary in the presence of severe
ﬁscal strain, provided that monetary policy is severely constrained and cannot cushion the
adverse eﬀects of sovereign risk on private-sector borrowing conditions. In this case, a cut
in government spending that reduces the deﬁcit may set in motion a virtuous circle, which
brings down interest rate spreads and stimulates economic activity.24
4 Dynamic analysis
We now turn to a numerical analysis of the full model, as outlined in Section 2 above. This
allows us to revisit our analytical results while accounting for the possibility that sovereign
24The literature has emphasized that retrenchment after the ZLB episode can stimulate economic activity
while the economy is still at the ZLB, for example, Corsetti, Kuester, Meier and M¨ uller (2010) and Woodford
(2011), provided that the future retrenchment is persistent enough. For completeness, Appendix A discusses
how the sovereign-risk channel aﬀects the conclusions for such a timing of retrenchment. We ﬁnd that, for the
packages we consider, there are parameterizations under which such a future retrenchment increases output at
the ZLB in the presence of a sovereign-risk channel, while it crowds out output in its absence. The opposite
is not true. In particular, whenever a future retrenchment package of the form we consider crowds in output
at the ZLB in the absence of a sovereign-risk channel, it also crowds in output at the ZLB in the presence of
the sovereign-risk channel. Indeed, any positive crowding in eﬀect of a future retrenchment is even stronger if
the sovereign-risk channel is active.
29risk depends on the expected debt level rather than the expected deﬁcit as in Section 3. In
order to highlight the role of monetary policy, we focus again on a ZLB scenario. However,
we depart from the simplifying assumption that the expected duration of the ZLB episode is
constant. Instead, we envisage a scenario in which a) the initial debt level matters for the
depth of the recession and b) in which ﬁscal retrenchment may alter the length of the lower
bound episode.25
4.1 Deep recessions, sovereign risk, and ﬁscal retrenchment
To set the stage for our analysis, we subject the model economy to a large recessionary shock
that pushes the economy to the ZLB. We specify a ﬁrst-order autoregressive process for   et
in order to capture in a stylized manner the output loss in the U.S. during the 2007–2009
recession. In particular, the Congressional Budget Oﬃce (2011) estimates that the output
gap reached 6.7 percent in 2009 and that it will still be at a 1.7 percent level in 2014 and at
0.5 percent in 2015.26 For the simulations, we also assume that taxes do stabilize the debt
level, but only very gradually.27 While the simulations for the baseline scenario assume that
taxes are raised in a lump-sum manner, Section 4.2 assesses the extent to which distortionary
taxation would aﬀect our conclusions.
Figure 5 shows the evolution of output, the interest rate spread and the policy rate in response
to the recessionary shock. It displays the behavior of the economy in the absence of any
discretionary ﬁscal policy measure for three diﬀerent initial levels of government debt: 60
percent of GDP (black solid line), 90 (blue dashed line) and 115 percent (red dots). The
adjustment dynamics diﬀer substantially in that the decline in output and the rise of the
interest rate spread are stronger if initial debt is high. To understand this result, note that
the shock induces an increase in the budget deﬁcit, which leads to a build-up of public debt
and thus an increase in the sovereign-risk premium. Moreover, since the shock pushes the
25We solve the model economy under perfect foresight using standard techniques.
26Given the process log(et) = ρe log(et−1) + ut, we set u0 = −0.1525 (setting ut = 0 for all other periods)
and ρe = 0.93 to roughly replicate those values for our baseline economy with a level of debt-to-GDP of 60
percent. At the time of writing, the CBO had not yet published output gap estimates and forecasts based on
the revision to the national income and product accounts released by the BEA on July 29, 2011.
27In particular, unless noted otherwise, we set the response parameter φT,bg = 0.014 for the ﬁrst 30 quarters.
This response is twice as large as would be required to ensure stable debt dynamics in the absence of adverse
movements in the risk premium. At the same time, the adjustment of taxes is slow enough that absent
government spending cuts, the debt burden will be reduced only in a very gradual manner. Beyond quarter
30, φT,bg rises to twice the previous value, ensuring that the sovereign debt will eventually be stabilized even
for the higher levels of sovereign indebtedness (and the correspondingly high risk premium).
30Figure 5: Deep recession with diﬀerent initial levels of sovereign debt
output (% from ss) interest rate spread (ann. bps) policy rate (APR)

















Notes: The ﬁgure shows responses to the recessionary shock for diﬀerent initial debt levels. Black solid line:
60 percent debt-to-GDP, blue dashed: 90 percent, red dots: 115 percent. Output is expressed in terms of
percentage deviations from the steady state, the risk premium in annualized basis points, and the interest
rate in annualized percentage rates.
economy to the ZLB, monetary policy is unable to oﬀset the spillover from sovereign-risk to
private interest rates. Private expenditure thus falls further, adding to the initial decline in
output. This eﬀect is the stronger the higher the initial debt level, because the relationship
between public debt and sovereign risk is fundamentally nonlinear.
In our simulations, a persistently high risk premium also implies that the time span over
which the lower bound remains binding is longer. This becomes apparent once one considers
the dynamics of the policy rate shown in the right panel of Figure 5: the ZLB episode is
extended by as much as 11 quarters if sovereign debt is high. Hence, our dynamic analysis
delivers a ﬁrst additional insight: not only does the importance of the sovereign-risk channel
depend on whether the central bank is constrained in setting the interest rate to the desired
level, but sovereign risk may itself be an important determinant for how strongly monetary
policy is constrained in the face of certain shocks.
We now analyze the eﬀects of government spending cuts that are assumed to take place in the
recessionary environment just described. Speciﬁcally, in order to mimic the setup of Section
3, we consider a sequence of spending cuts that last for two years and start at the onset of the
recession, that is, we consider an “immediate retrenchment” scenario. We discuss alternative
timing assumptions in Section 4.2. The spending cuts equal 2 percent of (steady-state) GDP
per period. Figure 6 shows their eﬀect relative to the baseline scenario. The panels on the left
31Figure 6: The eﬀect – relative to the baseline – of immediate retrenchment
Timing of ZLB exit endogenous ZLB lasts for 7 quarters ZLB lasts for 18 quarters
a) Eﬀect on output (% deviation from ss)























b) Eﬀect on risk premium (bps, annualized)


















Notes: The eﬀect of an immediate retrenchment in government spending by 2 percent of steady-state output
for 8 quarters on output (top) and the risk premium (bottom). Solid black line: 60% initial debt to GDP
ratio, dashed blue line 90%, dotted red line: 115%. Left panel: the eﬀect of the retrenchment package when
the timing of the exit from the ZLB is endogenously determined according to equation (36). Other panels:
for each initial debt level, the depth of the recession without retrenchment is calibrated such that it implies
that the ZLB will bind until quarter 6 (center) and 17 (right). For the center and rightmost panels, regardless
of the austerity package implemented, monetary policy is assumed to keep the nominal rate at zero for that
time period (until quarter 6 and 17, respectively).
32show the response of output (top) and the interest rate spread (bottom). In order to isolate
the eﬀect of a binding ZLB, the panels in the middle and on the right show the response
of the same variables under the assumption that the exit from the ZLB is not endogenous,
but ﬁxed exogenously at 7 and 18 quarters. These lengths correspond, respectively, to the
duration of the lower bound episode with a 60 and 115 percent debt-to-GDP ratio in Figure
5.28
We ﬁnd, ﬁrst, that for all initial debt levels, the retrenchment package is eﬀective in reducing
the deﬁcit (not shown). Thus the level of sovereign debt and thereby the risk premium (in
line also with Figure 4) decline. In addition, monetary policy does leave the lower bound
somewhat earlier for all debt levels (not shown). However, the spending cuts have quite
diﬀerent eﬀects on output in the diﬀerent scenarios we consider in our simulations. If initial
debt is low, in the wake of the spending cuts output falls initially by more than 2 percent, as
private expenditure declines. Yet, if initial debt is high, the initial output response is actually
positive, reﬂecting a strong increase in private expenditure. To understand this ﬁnding, recall
that spending cuts aﬀect real interest rates through two channels. On the one hand, the
deﬂationary eﬀect of spending cuts raises, all else equal, real interest rates as it cannot be
met by a reduction in policy rates at the ZLB. On the other hand, the reduction of public
debt reduces sovereign risk, thereby lowering private interest rate spreads at the ZLB. The
strength of the eﬀect operating through the second channel increases in the initial level of
debt, as, again, the relationship between public debt and sovereign risk is fundamentally
nonlinear. In our simulations it dominates the ﬁnal outcome if we assume an initial debt level
of 115 percent of GDP.
As stressed above, the impact of the recessionary shock and the period of time for which
monetary policy is constrained depend on the initial level of debt. At the same time, the
initial level of debt determines the quantitative importance of the sovereign-risk channel. To
isolate the latter dimension, the panels in the center and right columns of Figure 6 show the
eﬀect of the austerity packages on output for diﬀerent debt levels, but ﬁxing the length of
the ZLB episode exogenously. If the lower bound is expected to be binding only for a short
period of time (center panels), the eﬀects of spending cuts hardly vary with the debt level.
The importance of sovereign risk thus appears limited. However, in line with our results in
28In the underlying computations, for each debt level, we rescale the initial recessionary shock such that the
ZLB binds for the desired length of time.
33Section 3, this changes quite dramatically if the lower bound is expected to be binding for a
longer time and if, therefore, monetary policy cannot sterilize the eﬀect of the risk premium
on economic activity for an extended period of time (right panels). In this case, we ﬁnd that
spending cuts have a positive and lasting eﬀect on economic activity if the initial level of
debt is high enough and therefore the risk premium is high (dotted red line, right panel).
Moreover, the output costs of spending cuts fall notably also for the intermediate, 90 percent,
level of debt to GDP (dashed blue line in the rightmost panel). Overall, we thus ﬁnd our
earlier results conﬁrmed: ﬁscal strain may alter the ﬁscal transmission mechanism through
the sovereign-risk channel, provided that monetary policy is expected to be constrained for
an extended period.
4.2 Further considerations
This section assesses the sensitivity of the previous results with respect to modiﬁcations that
may have a bearing on the workings of the sovereign-risk channel. We start by assessing how
an alternative timing of cuts aﬀects the outcome of ﬁscal retrenchment. We then explore
alternative assumptions on how taxes are raised and monetary policy is conducted.
4.2.1 The timing of spending cuts
So far, we have focused on spending cuts that take place immediately, that is, at the time
the recessionary shocks impact the economy. Such a scenario is conceptually close to the
one considered in Section 3, which we adopted for analytical convenience. We now assess in
more detail the role of the timing of retrenchment measures on the basis of model simulations.
Speciﬁcally, while the left panels of Figure 7 repeat the results for an immediate retrenchment
that were reported in the left column in Figure 6, the remaining columns report the impact
of two alternatively timed consolidation packages. The center panels show the response of
the economy to a package of spending cuts of 2 percent of steady-state GDP that starts
two years after the initial recessionary impact and that lasts for 10 years (a “medium-term
retrenchment”). The right panels show results for a combination of the previous two packages
(a “persistent retrenchment,” so spending cuts start immediately and last for 12 years in
total). As before, the ﬁgures report the eﬀect of these diﬀerent packages depending on the
initial level of debt (the range of the axes has been rescaled to accommodate the range implied
34by these simulations).
Figure 7: The timing of retrenchment
Immediate retrenchment Medium-term retrenchment Persistent retrenchment
a) Eﬀect on output (% deviation from ss)




















b) Eﬀect on interest rate spread (bps, annualized)


















Notes: The eﬀect of an immediate retrenchment in government spending by 2 percent of steady-state output
for 8 quarters on output (top) and the risk premium (bottom). Solid black line: 60% initial debt-to-GDP
ratio, dashed blue line 90%, dotted red line: 115%. For all the panels the timing of the exit from the ZLB is
endogenously determined according to equation (36). Left panels: immediate retrenchment (deﬁned in the
text), center: medium-term retrenchment, right: persistent retrenchment.
Under medium-term retrenchment (center panels), output gains from ﬁscal forward guidance
are possible in line with the results in Corsetti, Kuester, Meier and M¨ uller (2010). In this
case most or all of the spending cuts are implemented when monetary policy can again add to
stabilizing the economy by means of lowering the policy rate. Spending cuts reduce demand
and inﬂation at the time of the cuts, which leads the central bank to reduce the real interest
rate. The prospect of a lower long-term real rate crowds in consumption in the early periods
of the recession, and thus output, and quite strongly so. This leads to higher tax revenues
and implies an immediate reduction in the risk premium, which further stimulates demand
through reduced interest rate spreads. Note that such medium-term retrenchment is the more
35stimulative the weaker the ﬁscal situation is (dotted red line vs dashed blue line in the central
panels). Last, the persistent retrenchment scenario is a combination of the two previous
scenarios. In the simulations shown in the right column of Figure 7, persistent retrenchment
has the strongest eﬀect on the risk premium (red dotted line), but its output eﬀects are
generally somewhat smaller than in the medium-term retrenchment scenario.29
4.2.2 Distortionary taxation
In the absence of a binding ZLB, higher distortionary taxes reduce economic activity. To the
extent that an early retrenchment reduces the need for distortionary taxation in the future,
such an early retrenchment would be expected to be less harmful to economic activity than
we have reported so far. Figure 8 assesses this possibility, again by reporting results for three
debt levels.30
The ﬁrst column repeats the responses in the baseline, in which only lump-sum taxes are
used. The second column shows how distortionary taxation alters the eﬀect of the spending
cuts. In the simulations, distortionary taxation, if used throughout, has little bearing on
how retrenchment aﬀects output. While lower future distortionary taxation stimulates future
economic activity, and thus current demand, in our simulations, a second, countervailing eﬀect
is present. Without a retrenchment, distortionary tax rates rise more strongly (with a view
toward stabilizing the rising debt burden). As stressed by Eggertsson (2011), to the extent
that higher labor tax rates raise inﬂation, they may actually help to stabilize output if the
economy is stuck at the ZLB. Instead, an early retrenchment reduces the labor tax burden
and exerts a negative eﬀect on activity, which, in the simulations shown here, outweighs the
positive eﬀects due to the reduced tax burden in later periods.
One may argue, however, about the extent to which taxes would actually be increased while
the economy remains in a lower bound situation. Since the timing of taxation is important
for the aforementioned results, the rightmost column of Figure 8 shows results for a diﬀerent
29For the higher, 115 percent level of debt, the persistent retrenchment continues to crowd in economic
activity for most of the time that the economy remains constrained by the lower bound on interest rates. It
crowds in initial output by less than the medium-term retrenchment alone, because, in the simulations shown,
already the medium-term retrenchment does considerably reduce the sovereign debt burden relative to the
baseline. Any additional retrenchment yields relatively little reduction in the sovereign-risk premium.
30For this exercise, the labor tax rate is calibrated to 35 percent in the steady state, in line with the 2006
average U.S. marginal income tax rate reported by Barro and Redlick (2011). Fluctuations in labor taxes
ensure that (28) holds. For the scenarios with labor taxes, we set φT,bg = 0.0193 for all periods.
36Figure 8: Eﬀects of retrenchment on output depending on taxation
Baseline Only labor taxes Labor tax after ZLB
a) Immediate retrenchment

































Notes: The eﬀect of retrenchment on output spending for diﬀerent assumptions about taxation. The left
column repeats the eﬀect of retrenchment with lump-sum taxes (as in the baseline). The center panel shows
the eﬀect of retrenchment when labor taxes (instead of lump-sum taxes) are used throughout. The right
column shows the eﬀect of retrenchment if for the ﬁrst 18 quarters taxes are lump-sum but distortionary
thereafter. For the simulations in which labor taxes are used we have rescaled the initial shock such that for
each debt level the size of the recession and the length of the ZLB episode without retrenchment is roughly
comparable to the baseline responses shown in Figure 5.
taxation scenario. It aims to purge the eﬀects of retrenchment from the eﬀects that labor
taxes have in a lower bound situation. In particular, the responses in that column are based
on the assumption that for the ﬁrst 18 quarters lump-sum taxes are in place that prevent
the debt from exploding. Only thereafter do labor taxes (and no longer any lump-sum taxes)
ensure that the debt is stabilized. That is, labor taxes respond only well after the lower
bound has ceased to bind. For the 60 percent debt level, the diﬀerence to the case of lump-
sum taxation is small and the eﬀects are very similar to the baseline. For the 90 percent
debt level, the output eﬀects of retrenchment turn more favorable. However, this mostly
37aﬀects the medium-term retrenchment packages. Finally, results for the highest debt level
shown here, 115 percent debt, illustrate that the sovereign-risk channel may be stronger in
the case with distortionary taxation than without, provided that changes in distortionary
tax rates materialize only after the the ZLB has ceased to bind. Intuitively, for this level of
sovereign indebtedness, the heightened risk premium demands relatively strong increases in
distortionary taxes to ﬁnance the debt burden, which by itself worsens the recession. As a
result, an early retrenchment now crowds in output throughout, and much more strongly so
than in the case with lump-sum taxes only.
4.2.3 Degree of absorption of risk premium
Next, we consider the sensitivity of our results with regard to the extent to which the central
bank will, in fact, be capable of sterilizing the eﬀect of sovereign risk on private borrowing
rates. In particular, our baseline simulations have assumed that once out of the lower bound
situation, the central bank can set interest rates in a way that prevents the sovereign risk
from aﬀecting economic activity.
We now assess, instead, the eﬀect of spending cuts if the central bank does not, or cannot,
fully neutralize the sovereign spread. The lower panels of Figure 9 show the results of ﬁscal
retrenchment when the central bank does not (or cannot) respond as vigorously to the interest
rate spread. In particular, we assume that the central bank’s response is only three-quarters
the size of the value of φω that we used in the previous simulations. Namely, we set φω =
0.75(πb + sΩ). Relative to the case of full sterilization (upper panel), we ﬁnd, in particular,
that the eﬀects of early retrenchment are less detrimental to economic activity if the initial
level of debt is high, and, hence the sovereign-risk channel potentially important. However,
for higher debt levels the outcomes of retrenchment are generally more favorable even for
immediate debt levels of, say, 90 percent to GDP if the central bank cannot perfectly sterilize
the sovereign risk premium in the future.
4.2.4 Variations in the spillover or risk premium
We have so far treated the relationship of the interest spread and the level of debt as constant
over time. Yet, it is well known that there are shifts in attitudes toward risk, and thus in
the relationship between the debt level and the sovereign risk premium as well. Figure 10
38Figure 9: Eﬀects of retrenchment on output when CB cannot fully neutralize risk premium
Immediate Medium-term Persistent
Baseline – full sterilization




































Notes: The eﬀect of the three retrenchment packages (described in the notes to Figure 7), when the central
bank does not fully absorb the risk premium even once the economy has left the lower bound. Top row shows
the baseline responses for 60, 90, and 100 percent initial debt-to-GDP levels. Bottom row shows the case when
the response coeﬃcient φω is 3/4 of the size of the benchmark calibration.
39highlights this for three diﬀerent dates of the World Economic Outlook forecasts: April 2010,
October 2010, and April 2011. The CDS spreads are taken at the beginning of the month
following publication of the forecast.
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Notes: Same as Figure 2, but for diﬀerent times. The ﬁgure
shows 5-year sovereign CDS spreads for industrialized coun-
tries against forecasts for gross general government debt
over GDP. The debt forecasts are IMF World Economic
Outlook forecasts as of April 2011, October 2010 and April
2010. The CDS spreads are taken on the ﬁrst day of the fol-
lowing month. For the April forecasts, the debt/GDP ratio
forecast is for the full year. For the October forecast, it is
for the following year. The lines shown are curves ﬁtted to
the risk premium
Similarly, Figure 1 suggests that the relationship between public debt and the private risk
premium may be somewhat uncertain. In the context of our model, we proxy for such an
uncertainty by allowing for a random increase in the spillover from the sovereign risk premium
to the interest rate spread. Speciﬁcally, we assume that initially the pass-through from
sovereign risk to private-sector risk is 0.3, in line with the correlation for low-spread economies
in Figure 1, but that in each period there is a 20 percent probability that the spillover increases
to the correlation for high-spread economies in the latter ﬁgure – and will stay at that level
thereafter.
Figure 11 shows the results for a debt level of 110 percent (under the calibration on data for
April 2011). These results suggest, and perhaps not surprisingly, that the importance of the
sovereign-risk channel increases under these circumstances.
40Figure 11: Change of spillover – 110 percent debt
no risk of higher spillover risk of higher spillover















Notes: The eﬀect of the three retrenchment packages (described earlier
in the text) when the degree of spillover can shift. The sovereign risk
premium curve is taken in April 2011. Left: spillover permanently stays
at αψ = 0.3. Right: a 20 percent chance per period that the spillover
shifts to αψ = 0.7. Shown is the average eﬀect of retrenchment.
415 Conclusion
Most industrialized countries are facing a period of signiﬁcant ﬁscal consolidation, including
sizeable spending cuts. How much will these cuts hurt economic activity? While standard
multiplier analysis suggests signiﬁcant headwinds for growth, the current paper shows that
the eﬀects of ﬁscal retrenchment will depend on the precise circumstances under which they
are enacted.
In this paper, we consider two conditions that appear to characterize well the current macroe-
conomic stance in a number of OECD countries, namely, i) severe ﬁscal strain, as evidenced
by a high sovereign risk premium; and ii) a limited capacity of monetary policy to reduce
policy rates, given the zero lower bound. We formally analyze the role of the sovereign risk
channel within a variant of the model proposed by C´ urdia and Woodford (2009). Two sets of
results stand out. First, sovereign risk increases the indeterminacy problem for constrained
monetary policy. In particular, private-sector beliefs about a weakening economy can become
self-fulﬁlling, driving up risk premiums and choking oﬀ private demand. In this environ-
ment, an expected pro-cyclical ﬁscal stance, that is, tighter ﬁscal policy, can help to ensure
determinacy.
Second, we use a simpliﬁed version of our model to show analytically that the sovereign risk
channel may, in principle, alter the sign of the output multiplier of government spending, as
upfront ﬁscal tightening leads to lower funding costs throughout the economy. Simulations of
the full-ﬂedged model conﬁrm this ﬁnding. Indeed, a recessionary shock may simultaneously
restrict monetary policy and cause ﬁscal strain, especially where public debt is already high
at the outset. Under these circumstances ﬁscal retrenchment is likely to be less detrimental
to economic activity or may have beneﬁcial eﬀects relative to a scenario without sovereign
risk.
In closing, we emphasize three caveats. First, both ﬁscal strain and the constraints on mon-
etary policy may need to be quite severe in order for government spending cuts to actually
stimulate economic activity. Second, in our simulations, a ﬁscal retrenchment is no miracle
cure for the economy’s ills. In particular, in all our simulations the recession remains deep
even if the ﬁscal retrenchment stimulates economic activity relative to an even bleaker base-
line. Third and last, here we have focused on ﬁscal multipliers under a “go-it-alone” policy
that does not involve an outright bailout or temporary ﬁnancial support at below-market
42rates from international institutions, both of which would somewhat weaken the case for an
expansionary ﬁscal retrenchment.
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A Retrenchment after the ZLB phase
The analytical results presented in Section 3 pertain to ﬁscal retrenchment while the economy
is still at the ZLB. For completeness, we also consider in this appendix a retrenchment that
is designed to take eﬀect only once the economy has left the ZLB. As discussed in Corsetti,
Kuester, Meier and M¨ uller (2010), ﬁscal consolidation some time in the future does reduce
demand and inﬂation contemporaneously but may have positive output eﬀects well before
it is implemented. In fact, if spending consolidation is implemented when the central bank
is no longer constrained by the ZLB, in reaction to its eﬀect on inﬂation the policy rate
(Rt) will fall in both nominal and real terms (recall, φπ > 1). In anticipation of a path of
lower interest rates, long-term interest rates will contract as of today, thereby crowding in
consumption and output even if the economy continues to be at the ZLB. However, by the very
nature of this transmission mechanism, the exact timing of consolidation is crucial. When
ﬁrms anticipate the future drop in demand, because of nominal rigidities they start to reduce
prices before government demand actually falls. In other words, inﬂation falls in anticipation
of the retrenchment. If much of the retrenchment happens too close to the period in which
the economy has left the ZLB, its eﬀect on the real rate of interest can be perverse, that is,
real rates may rise while the economy is still at the ZLB—hampering the recovery. In order
to assess the eﬀects on economic activity more formally, we state the following proposition
and corollary.
Proposition 4 In the economy speciﬁed in Proposition 1, let ˜ gt take on a value of = 0
whenever the ZLB is binding. Once the ZLB ceases to bind, ˜ gt = ga < 0, in the ﬁrst period,
47and subsequently with probability ̺ ∈ [0,1). Otherwise ˜ gt = 0 forever. Assuming that the




¯ σ(1 − β )[log(R) − Γ] + (1 −  )(1 − β )(1 + ¯ σξφT,y)(ya − ga) + ¯ σ(1 −  )πa




where d = (1−β )[1−a]−¯ σ κy, a :=  + ξφT,y¯ σ as in Proposition 1, and ya and πa denote,
respectively, output and inﬂation in the austerity period, equal to
ya =
(1 − ̺)(1 − β̺) + ¯ σ(φπ − ̺)κg




(1 − ̺)(κy − κg)
(1 − ̺)(1 − β̺) + ¯ σ(φπ − ̺)κy
ga. (44)
Proof. See Appendix B.
Corollary 5 Under the conditions in Proposition 4,
1. if ξ = 0, retrenchment after the ZLB phase enhances economic activity at the ZLB
phase unless too much of it is expected to occur too close to the exit from the ZLB. More
precisely, there exists a value of ̺ ∈ [0,1) such that yl > 0 if ga < 0. This is the case
for any ̺ >
1+φπ(βµ−1)
βµ .
2. Provided that the eﬀect of future austerity on yl is positive, the magnitude of such an
eﬀect will be larger the more sensitive the economy is to the risk premium (the larger is
ξ).
3. In addition, there are parameterizations for which the eﬀect of future austerity is positive
if ξ > 0, while it is negative if ξ = 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Here we are primarily interested in the output eﬀects during the ZLB period. Corollary 5
provides a detailed characterization. In the absence of a risk-premium channel, the corollary
shows that future spending cuts that take eﬀect after the end of the ZLB phase raise output
in the ZLB phase unless too much of the retrenchment is expected to occur too close after
the exit from the ZLB, i.e., future retrenchment eﬀorts need to be suﬃciently persistent;
compare Corsetti, Kuester, Meier and M¨ uller (2010) and Woodford (2011). The corollary
also highlights that the risk-premium channel would enhance any crowding in of output while
at the lower bound; see Item 2 of Corollary 5). In addition, for certain parameterizations,
future retrenchment, even if not particularly persistent, may stimulate output at the ZLB if
48the ﬁscal situation is weak (ξ > 0) while such a retrenchment would have negative eﬀects in
the absence of the sovereign risk channel, that is, for ξ = 0 (Item 3).
B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The economy, stripped from exogenous variables, is given by
Etzt+1 = Azt,









where a = (  +  ¯ σξφT,y). The Blanchard-Kahn conditions for determinacy require that
matrix A have two roots outside the unit circle. Woodford (2003) gives the following
necessary and suﬃcient conditions for determinacy:
either (Case I): (i) det(A) > 1, (ii) det(A) − tr(A) > −1, and (iii) det(A) + tr(A) > −1,
or (Case II): (i) det(A) − tr(A) < −1 and (ii) det(A) + tr(A) < −1.
In the current case, det(A) = 1
aµβ and tr(A) = 1
aµβ[ β + ¯ σ κy + a]. Since both det(A) > 0
and tr(A) > 0 Case II cannot be satisﬁed. Checking Case I, condition (iii) holds since both
terms are positive. Condition (i) is equivalent to condition a) in the proposition. Condition
(ii) of Case I is equivalent to condition b) in the proposition. ￿






  β + ¯ σ∗ κ∗





where a∗, ¯ σ∗ and κ∗
y are deﬁned in the proposition.
1. Note that under the restriction that a∗ > 0, det(A) > 0. Therefore it cannot be the
case that det(A)−tr(A) < −1 and det(A) +tr(A) < −1. This means that determinacy
can only obtain under the conditions of Case I. In addition, if ϕ < 1, then tr(A) > 0,
so det(A) + tr(A) > −1. Condition c is therefore obsolete if ϕ < 1.
492. For a∗ < 0, det(A) < 0, so Case I cannot hold. The conditions given in the proposition
are those pertaining to Case II. ￿
B.3 Corollary 6 to Proposition 2 and Proof
Corollary 6 Under the conditions of Proposition 2, the following special cases obtain:
1. With no endogenous risk premium (ξ = 0), the range of parameters for which the
equilibrium is determinate is larger if spending is countercyclical (ϕ < 0), rather than
acyclical. In addition, the range of fundamental parameters implying determinacy of
the equilibrium is smaller, the larger ϕ.
2. With an endogenous risk premium ξ > 0, instead, the range of parameters for which the
equilibrium is determinate is often larger if spending is procyclical, i.e., if spending is
cut during a deep recession. More precisely:
(a) If the conditions of Part 1 of Proposition 2 hold as well as ϕ ∈ (0,1) and φT,y <
1 − κν
(1−βµ)ξ, then the range of fundamental parameters for which the equilibrium
is determinate is at least as large as in the absence of an endogenous response in
spending, and can be larger. Note that this case is more likely, the less elastic the
tax revenue responds to the state of the economy (the smaller φT,y), and the more
responsive the country’s risk premium to the deﬁcit (the larger ξ).
(b) It may occur that the equilibrium is indeterminate if government spending does not
respond to output, but becomes determinate with a mild procyclical response that
satisﬁes
1+ξ¯ σφT,y
1+ξ¯ σ < ϕ < 1 (this is is only case under which the conditions of Case
2 of Proposition 2 can hold). Note that this inequality is more likely satisﬁed the
steeper the risk premium and the less elastic the response of taxes.
Proof.
1. If ξ = 0, a∗ =   > 0. As a result condition Case 1 of Proposition 2 gives the relevant
condition. First note that condition a) will always be satisﬁed. Condition c) holds for
ϕ < 1. What remains to be checked therefore is whether condition b) holds for ϕ < 0
whenever it holds for ϕ = 0, and holds for some fundamental parameters for which it
would not hold otherwise. That is true if
(1 − β )(1 − a∗) −  ¯ σ∗κ∗
y > (1 − β )(1 − a) −  ¯ σκy,
or equivalently (for ξ = 0),
 ¯ σ∗κ∗
y −  ¯ σκy < 0.







−  κ[¯ σν + 1] < 0.
This reduces to ϕ/(1 − ϕ) < 0, which is true for ϕ < 0. So the range of fundamental
parameters for which determinacy obtains is bigger with a countercyclical government
spending response in this case than in the absence of any response. What remains to be
shown is that a stronger response further increases the range of fundamental parameters
for which determinacy obtains. To see this, observe that the left-hand side of condition
b) in Case 1 of Proposition 2 is independent of ϕ. The right-hand side is given by
 ¯ σ∗κ∗
y =  κ[1 + ν¯ σ/(1 − ϕ)].
The right-hand side is strictly increasing in ϕ. As a result, the set of parameters for
which the condition will bind will be the larger the more negative ϕ is.
2. (a) The range of fundamental parameters for which determinacy holds is bigger if
a∗ < a, and if
(1 − β )(a − a∗) >  ¯ σ∗κ∗
y −  ¯ σκy.
a∗ < a boils down to
φT,y−ϕ
1−ϕ < φT,y, which is true for ϕ < 1. The second condition
reduces to







For ϕ ∈ (0,1) this yields φT,y < 1 − κν
(1−βµ)ξ, the condition in the corollary.
(b) a∗ < 0 means
1+ξ¯ σφT,y
1+ξ¯ σ < ϕ < 1, so this is the only case in which Part 2 of
Proposition 2 can be satisﬁed.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 3
The assumed Markov structure means that output, inﬂation and government spending (in
deviation from the steady state) will take on the same values while the lower bound binds,
51yl,πl and gl, respectively, and values of zero thereafter. The IS curve thus implies
yl − gl =  (yl − gl) − ¯ σ[−log(1 + id) + Γ +  ξ(gl − φT,yyl) −  πl].
And the Phillips curve implies
πl =  βπl + κyyl − κggl.
Solving these equations for yl and πl gives for yl:
yl = ϑr[log(1 + id) − Γ] + ϑggl,
where ϑr and ϑg take on the values given in the proposition. In addition, ϑr > 0: the
numerator is positive, and the denominator is positive, too, by condition b) for determinacy
in Proposition 1. ￿
B.5 Corollary 7 to Proposition 3 and Proof
Corollary 7 Under the parameter restrictions of Proposition 1:
1. The government spending multiplier, ϑg, is positive if and only if
(1 −  ) −
 ¯ σκg
1 − β 
>  ξ¯ σ. (45)
Note that, conversely, the spending multiplier will be negative if the risk premium suﬃ-
ciently aﬀects the economy, i.e., if ξ is large enough.
2. If ξ = 0, provided that the conditions for determinacy in Proposition 1 are satisﬁed, the
government spending multiplier is strictly larger than one. This case corresponds to the
analysis by Christiano et al. (2011) and Woodford (2011).
3. If ξ > 0, the government spending multiplier is unambiguously larger than one if φT,y >
1 − κν
ξ(1−βµ), that is, if the tax revenue rises suﬃciently fast with output. In addition,
government spending at the lower bound is self-ﬁnancing if ϑg > 1/φT,y.
Proof.
1. Under the restrictions for determinacy of Proposition 1, the denominator of ϑg is un-
ambiguously positive. ϑg > 0 thus requires (1 − β )(1 −b) − ¯ σκg > 0, which solves to
the expression in equation (45).
522. The conditions for determinacy require that (1 − β )(1 − a) −  ¯ σκy > 0, so the de-
nominator of ϑg is positive. The same condition can also be used to prove that the
numerator of ϑg is positive. Extending the above inequality yields:
(1 − β )(1 − b) −  ¯ σκg > −(1 − β )(b − a) −  ¯ σ(κg − κy).
Note that κg < κy. In addition, note that b = a if ξ = 0. This proves that (1−β )(1−
b) −  ¯ σκg > 0 if ξ = 0 and under the conditions of Proposition 1.
3. For ξ > 0, ϑg > 1 is equivalent, after substituting for κg and κy, to φT,y > 1 −
κφ
ξ(1−βµ).
The deﬁcit is given by g−φT,yyl. Spending will thus be self-ﬁnancing if 1−φT,yϑg < 0.
B.6 Proof of Proposition 4
For the austerity phase the IS equation is given by
(ya − ga)(1 − ̺) = −¯ σ[φππa − ̺πa].
The Phillips curve is given by
πa = β̺πa + κyya − κgga.
These two equations solve to expressions (43) and (44). While at the lower bound, the IS
equation is given by
yl(1− ) = (1− )(ya−ga)−¯ σ
 
−log(R) + Γ + ξ[(1 −  )ga − φT,y(1 −  )ya − φT,y yl] −  πl − (1 −  )πa
 
.
The Phillips curve is given by
πl = β πl + β(1 −  )πa + κyl.
Solving the latter two equations leads to the equation for output, yl, equation (42).
B.7 Proof of Corollary 5
1. For the case ξ = 0, abstracting from constants, we have that yl = 1/d[(1 −  )(1 −
β )(ya − ga) + ¯ σ(1 −  )πa].
53Note that d = (1 −  )(1 − β ) − ¯ σ κy > 0 since Proposition 4 assumes determinacy of
the equilibrium; cp. condition b) in Proposition 1. yl > 0 (meaning that future austerity
increases output at the ZLB relative to the case of no action) thus requires
(1 −  )(1 − β )(ya − ga) + ¯ σ(1 −  )πa > 0. (46)
Substitute for ya and πa using equations (43) and (44). Further note that the denom-
inator in the expressions for πa and ya is positive (we have assumed determinacy in
Proposition 4, so φπ > 1, and therefore especially φπ − ̺ > 0). Furthermore, observe





l denote the size of output at the lower bound with a response of the risk premium
(ξ > 0). Denote with a superscript o the terms in the absence of a response of the risk
premium. For example, let yo
l denote the size of output in the absence of a response of
the risk premium (ξ = 0).
Note, ﬁrst, that ya,ga,πa are independent of the risk premium.
Note, second, that dw = (1 − β )(1 −   −  ξφT,y¯ σ) − ¯ σ κy < do.
Note, third, that dw > 0 by the assumption of determinacy. Thus [ do
dw − 1] > 0.
Condition yw
l > yo





¯ σ(1 −  )(κg − κy)[(1 − β )(φπ − ̺) − 1 + ̺]
+ do
dw ¯ σ(φπ − ̺)(κg − κy)¯ σξφT,y(1 −  )(1 − β )
+(1 −  )(1 − β )[(1 − ̺)(1 − β̺) + ¯ σ(φπ − ̺)κy] ¯ σξ(φT,y − 1) < 0.
The second row is nonpositive. The third row is strictly negative (since φT,y ∈ [0,1)).
κg − κy < 0, so the ﬁrst row will be strictly negative if (1 − β )(φπ − ̺) − 1 + ̺ > 0,
which is equivalent to ̺ >
1+φπ(βµ−1)
βµ .
3. It suﬃces to show one such parameterization. In particular, let φT,y = 0. In that case,
the sovereign risk channel does not aﬀect the determinacy condition, nor does it aﬀect
the denominator deﬁned as d above. The condition that ensures that a retrenchment
54after the ZLB has a positive eﬀect on output while at the ZLB is
1
d
[(1 −  )(1 − β )(ya − ga) + ¯ σ(1 −  )πa − d(1 −  )(1 − β )¯ σξga] > 0
Now, ya,πa do not depend on ξ. In addition, under the conditions provided in the
proposition, d(1− )(1−β )¯ σξ is unambiguously positive if ξ > 0 while ga is negative.
As a result, for any persistence of the retrenchment ̺ (and so in particular also for those
that violate the inequality provided in Item 1), there exist values of ξ ≥ 0 that make
the above condition hold.
C Nonlinear model equations
This section collects all the equations of the model and the fundamental parameters of the
economy.
C.1 Consumer and labor supply









































































Aggregate labor supply (deﬁnition)
ht = πbhb





















Deﬁnition average marginal utility of consumption:
λt = πbλb
t + (1 − πb)λs
t.
Aggregate private borrowing:
bt = δbt−1(1 + ωt−1)(1 + id

















Deﬁnition spread between lending and deposit rates:







ωt = χt + Ξt.
Fraction of loans lost or resource costs of origination:
χt = χψ[(1 + i
g
t)/(1 + id
t)]αψ − 1 and Ξt = 0, or Ξt = χψ[(1 + i
g
t)/(1 + id
t)]αψ − 1 and χt = 0.
56C.3 Firms and NKPC













































































Part of tax revenue related to the business cycle and stabilization policy:
trt := τw




(trt − tr) =
 




, φT,y ≥ 0, φT,b > 0.
In addition, we need to specify a rule for τw
t . Indeed, for most of the paper, τw
t = 0.



















ϑdef with probability pt,










Demand for ﬁnal goods is given by
yt = πbcb
t + πscs
t + gt + Ξt bt






C.6 Summary: Model variables
Exogenous variables: et, gt, zt.
















t /Pt, Πt, τw
t , T
g
t /Pt, trt, ϑt, wt, Ξt, yt.
C.7 Summary: Fundamental parameters
α: Calvo stickiness.
αbg: ﬁrst parameter in the distribution of the “ﬁscal limit.”
αψ: spillover parameter sovereign spread to private-sector spread.
β : time-discount factor.
βbg: second parameter in the distribution of the “ﬁscal limit.”
b
g,max
: third parameter in the distribution of the “ﬁscal limit.”
χψ : scaling parameter interest spread borrower-lender.
δ : persistence of type
 p : gross price markup,  p = θ/(θ − 1).
ν : inverse of Frisch elasticity.
58φ: elasticity of hours with respect to output.
φΠ: Taylor rule response to inﬂation.
φω: Taylor rule response to private-sector spread.
φT,y : response of taxes to output.
φT,b : response of taxes to debt.
πb: fraction of borrowers
πs : fraction of savers
ψb: scaling constant disutility of work borrower.
ψs : scaling constant disutility of work saver.
σs: IES saver
σb : IES borrower
θ : elasticity of demand.
ϑdef : haircut
ξ b: scaling parameter utility of consumption borrower.
ξ s: scaling parameter utility of consumption saver.
D Linearized model
This section collects the linearized model equations. For the sake of brevity of exposition, we
drop the expectations operator. It is implicitly understood that all terms carrying a t + 1
index refer to the expectations as of period t of those variables. Also, in the derivations we
impose that output in the steady state equals unity, y = 1.
D.1 Consumer and labor supply
Euler equation savers (for deposits)
  et +   λ
s
t =   et+1 +  id
t −   Πt+1 + (1 − χs)  λ
b
t+1 + χs  λ
s
t+1.
Euler equation savers (government bonds)
  et +   λ
s
t =   et+1 +  i
g
t −   Πt+1 −
pϑdef
1 − pϑdef
  pt+1 + (1 − χs)  λ
b




  et +   λ
b
t =   et+1 +  ib
t −   Πt+1 + χb  λ
b
t+1 + (1 − χb)  λ
s
t+1.
Marginal utility of consumption saver
  cs
t = −σs  λ
s
t .
Marginal utility of consumption borrower
  cb
t = −σb  λ
b
t .








t +   τ
w
t +   wt
 
.








t +   τw
t +   wt
 
.
Aggregate labor supply (deﬁnition)
h  ht = πb hb  hb
t + (1 − πb)hs   hs
t .
Implied FOC for aggregate labor supply (redundant)




  Λt +   τw




  Λt = γb  λ
b
t + (1 − γb)  λ
s
t.
Deﬁnition average marginal utility of consumption:












˜ bt = δ(1 + ω)(1 + id)/Π˜ bt−1
+δb(1 + ω)(1 + id)/Π
 
  ωt−1 +  id
t−1 −   Πt
 
−πbω˜ bt − πbb(1 + ω)  ωt















t − cs  cs
t ) − w(hb − hs)  τ
w
t − (1 − τw)
 
w(hb − hs)  wt + whb  hb





  Ωt :=   λ
b
t −   λ
s
t :
Law of motion for   Ωt :
  Ωt =   ωt + ¯ δ   Ωt+1.
D.2 Financial intermediation
Deﬁnition spread between lending and deposit rates:
  ωt =  ib
t −  id
t.
FOC loan origination:
(1 + χ)  ωt =   χt or (1 + Ξ)  ωt =   Ξt.
( Note: if χ > 0, e.g., and so Ξ = 0, we have   ωt =   χt, where   χt := log(1 + χt) − log(1 + χ) )
Fraction of loans lost/intermediation costs :




t −  id
t
 








D.3 Firms and NKPC
New Keynesian Phillips curve:
  Πt = β  Πt+1+κ
 
(φ(1 + ν) + 1/¯ σ − 1)  yt − φ(1 + ν)  zt − 1/¯ σ[˜ gt + Ξ˜ bt] −   τ
w




















t−1 −   Πt
 
+ ˜ gt −   trt.
Tax rule
  trt = φT,y  yt + φT,bg ˜ b
g
t−1.
Ex ante probability of a default, pt, at a given level of indebtedness, b
g
t,





























Demand for ﬁnal goods is given by
  yt = πb sb   cb
t + πs ss   cs
t + ˜ gt + Ξ˜ bt + b   Ξt.
Supply of ﬁnal goods is given by




D.6 Deﬁnition of linearized variables
Exogenous variables:
  et = log(et/1).
˜ gt = gt − g.
  zt = log(zt/z).
Endogenous variables:












  χt = χt − χ.
  ∆t = log(∆t/∆),








t = log(1 + ib
t) − log(1 + ib)
  id
t = log(1 + id
t) − log(1 + id)
  i
d,∗
t = log(1 + i
d,∗
t ) − log(1 + id)
  i
g
t = log(1 + i
g
t) − log(1 + ig)









  Λt = log(Λt/Λ),
  ωt = log(1 + ωt) − log(1 + ω).
  Ωt :=   λ
b
t −   λ
s
t.
  pt = log(pt) − log(p)
  Πt = log(Πt) − log(Π)
  τw
t = log(1 − τw
t ) − log(1 − τw).
  trt = trt − tr.   ϑt = log([pt+1(1 − ϑdef) + [1 − pt+1]/[1 − pϑdef]).
  wt = log(wt/w),
  Ξt = Ξt − Ξ,
  yt = log(yt/y).
E Deﬁnition of auxiliary parameters
¯ δ :












































(1 − α)(1 − αβ)
α
1






















ΨΩ = πb(1 − χb) − πs(1 − χs).
σ:
σ = πbsbσb + πsssσs.






64F Three-equation representation of the aggregate economy
The following IS curve can be derived for the linearized model
  yt =   yt+1 − (˜ gt+1 − ˜ gt) −
 









  Ωt =   ωt + ¯ δ   Ωt+1.
With the New Keynesian Phillips curve being as above:
  Πt = β   Πt+1
+κ
 
(φ(1 + ν) + 1/¯ σ − 1)  yt − φ(1 + ν)  zt − 1/¯ σ[˜ gt + Ξ˜ bt + b   Ξt] −   τw












t ,−(1 + id,∗)
 
. The three-equation system, together with an assumption about
the evolution of the spread   ωt, describes the evolution of output, inﬂation and interest rates
(independently of private debt) if
1. Ξ = 0, that is, no aggregate resource costs of loan origination.
2. [ψΩ + sΩ(1 − ¯ δ)] = 0.
3.   τw
t = 0, that is, distortionary taxes don’t move or are nonexistent.
4. [sΩ + πb − γb] = 0.
The parameters and laws of motion chosen in the core of the paper satisfy these conditions.
G Linking ξ and ξ
′
This appendix provides the foundation for equation (38) in the main text. The formula is
motivated through a sequence of back-of-the-envelope calculations. Focus on the interest rate
spread in the IS curve, neglecting other terms. Assume that initially, in period t, the economy
65is at the lower bound. This gives a relationship of
˜ yt = Et˜ yt+1 − ¯ σ  ̟t + ....
Iterating forward, we have











where I() is the indicator function. If the spread depends on the future debt level, as in the
full version of the model presented in Section 2, we have

















Abstracting from eﬀects of interest payments and the valuation of debt, ˜ b
g
t+j+1 is roughly
the sum of an initial debt level in t − 1 (assumed to be zero without loss of generality in the
following exposition) and the deﬁcits accumulated in period t through t + j + 1. Let deficit
be the deﬁcit. Following the Markov structure, we assume that the structural primary deﬁcit
(before extraordinary debt-stabilization measures) is the same in every period at the ZLB.
With the same abstraction as above, conditional on being at the ZLB in t + j,
Et+j ˜ b
g
t+j+1 = ˜ b
g
t+j +     deficit = (j + 1 +  )deficit.
Then,












˜ yt = −¯ σξ′ deficit
∞  
j=0
 j(j + 1 +  ),
or, equivalently.
˜ yt = −¯ σξ′ 1 +  (1 −  )
(1 −  )2 deficit. (47)
66In contrast, the analytical version of the model in Section 3 has











which boils down to
˜ yt = −¯ σ ξ
∞  
j=0
 j deficit  .
Or, equivalently,
˜ yt = −¯ σξ
 
1 −  
deficit. (48)
Comparing (47) and (48) leads to the relationship in the main text, namely, equation (38):
ξ =
1 +  (1 −  )
 (1 −  )
ξ′.
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